In recent years, the number of satellites in orbit has surged dramatically, driven by the deployment of large-scale mega-constellations such as Starlink and OneWeb. Current projections estimate that more than 100,000 satellites will be launched in the coming decade, positioning satellite communication as a critical backbone of both consumer services and essential infrastructures.
Space-based systems are now providing a wide array of vital societal functions—ranging from global navigation and positioning, to telecommunication, Earth observation, and IoT connectivity. Yet, their central role in modern infrastructure also makes them highly attractive targets for cyber attacks. This risk is not theoretical: the attack on ViaSat during the early stages of the war in Ukraine and persistent disruptions of Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) worldwide highlight the tangible threats facing the domain.
Concerns about the cybersecurity of satellite systems have circulated since the mid-2000s, echoed in both academic research and hacker communities. Recent publications at leading security venues have reignited these debates, demonstrating that many long-standing vulnerabilities remain unresolved—and are now magnified by the unprecedented scale of satellite deployment. This raises a pressing question: why do these issues persist, despite years of awareness?
The answer lies, at least in part, in the unique nature of the space environment. The constraints of satellite design, deployment, and operation introduce challenges unlike those found in terrestrial systems. Addressing them requires novel approaches and interdisciplinary research at the intersection of space systems and cybersecurity.
| Paper Submission Deadline | |
| Notification of Acceptance | 16 December 2025 (AoE) |
| Workshop Date | 23 February 2026 (Pacific Standard Time) |
| Camera Ready Submission | 22 March 2026 (AoE) |
Juliana Furgala, Samuel Jero, Andrea Lin, Rick Skowyra (MIT Lincoln Laboratory)
Simon Shigol, Roy Peled, Avishag Shapira, Yuval Elovici, Asaf Shabtai (Ben Gurion University of the Negev)
Efrén López-Morales (New Mexico State University)
Young Eun Kwon, Ji Won Yoon (Korea University)
Aviel Ben Siman Tov, Edita Grolman, Yuval Elovici, Asaf Shabtai (Ben Gurion University of the Negev)
Rachel McAmis, Connor Willison, Richard Skowyra, Samuel Mergendahl (MIT Lincoln Laboratory)
Rajiv Thummala, Gregory Falco (Cornell University)
Joonhyuk Park, Jiwon Kwak, Geunwoo Baek, Dohee Kang, Seungjoo Kim (School of Cybersecurity, Korea University)
Julian Rederlechner, Ulysse Planta, Ali Abbasi (CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security)
Dongpyeong Seo, Jaewoo Park, Hocheol Nam, Min Suk Kang (KAIST)
Sylvester Kaczmarek (Imperial College London)
Shiqi Liu, Kun Sun (Center for Secure Information Systems, George Mason University)
Hyeon-Min Choi, Jae-Hyeon Park, Eun-Kyu Lee (Incheon National University)
Lyubomir Yanev, Pietro Ronchetti (ETH Zurich); Joshua Smailes (University of Oxford); Martin Strohmeier (armasuisse)
SeyedMohammad Kashani, Branden Lloyd Buhler, Sang Kim, Ashfaq Khokhar (Iowa State University)
Gabriel Torres, Raymond Govotski, Samuel Jero, Richard Skowyra, Samuel Mergendahl (MIT Lincoln Laboratory); Gruia-Catalin Roman (University of New Mexico); Joseph Trujilo (Air Force Research Laboratory Space Vehicles Directorate)
Ahsan Saleem, Andrei Costin (University of Jyväskylä, Finland); Guillermo Suarez-Tangil (IMDEA Networks Institute Madrid, Spain)
Salman Shamshad, Waqas Bin Abbas, Sana Belguith, Lucy Berthoud (University of Bristol, Bristol, United Kingdom)
The scope of SpaceSec covers all systems that are directly or indirectly connected to, or dependent on, space and satellite infrastructures. This includes communication links (satellite–ground and satellite–satellite), the ground segment (such as ground stations and terrestrial systems relying on satellite communications), and the space segment (including satellites and launch vehicles). We also consider the broad ecosystem of applications, use cases, and dependencies built upon satellite services. While all orbital regimes are of interest, particular emphasis is placed on research related to modern Low Earth Orbit (LEO) mega-constellations.
SpaceSec welcomes security contributions that demonstrate clear relevance to space and satellite systems and applications. Topics of interest include, but are not limited to:
All papers must be original and not simultaneously submitted to another journal or conference. The following paper types are welcome:
Short Paper: Maximum 4 pages. Short papers should provide enough context for the reader to understand the contribution. Preliminary work is encouraged but not required.
Long Paper: Maximum 8 pages. Traditional research papers.
Submissions should follow the double-column NDSS format. Page limits exclude the bibliography and appendices, which can be up to 2 pages for long papers and 1 page for short papers.
We invite submissions in the following categories:
Anonymization and the Review Process: The review process is double-blind. All submissions should be anonymized.
Publication: SpaceSec26 proceedings will be published post-conference with the NDSS 2026.
Further Notes: At least one author of each accepted paper must register for the workshop and present the paper. Simultaneous submission of the same work to multiple venues, submission of previously published work, and plagiarism are prohibited.
Vincent Lenders, University of Luxembourg (LUX), vincent.lenders@uni.lu
Gunes Karabulut Kurt, Polytechnique Montréal (CA), gunes.kurt@polymtl.ca
Simon Birnbach, University of Oxford (UK), simon.birnbach@cs.ox.ac.uk
Jessie Hamill-Stewart, University of Bath and University of Bristol (UK), jessie.hamill-stewart@bristol.ac.uk